



# Boyd's OODA Loop

## (It's Not What You Think)

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### Abstract

Although the strategic ideas of John Boyd encompass much more than the well known OODA loop, the loop does provide a concise framework for improving competitive power throughout an organization. Much of this power will be lost, however, if people use the most common version. Fortunately, Boyd only drew one sketch of the OODA loop, which bears little resemblance to the popular misconception, and that one is the key to his entire body of work.

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## **Introduction: A Non-school of Strategy**

The late USAF Colonel John R. Boyd (1927 - 1997) was hard on ideologues: “Don’t be a member of Clausewitz’s school because a lot has happened since 1832,” he would warn his audiences, “and don’t be a member of Sun Tzu’s school because an awful lot has happened since 400 BC.”

We should not be members of Boyd’s school, either: “If you’re going to regard this stuff as dogma,” he would say at some point in his briefings, “you’d be better served to take it out and burn it.” Why, then, spend time studying his works today? Boyd’s (1987a) answer was not to memorize the specific principles of any strategy—including his—but to follow his larger example, to achieve what he called “intuitive competence” in creating, employing and dealing with the novelty that permeates human life (Boyd, 1992).

### **Boyd Lives!**

In his eulogy, General Charles Krulak (as cited in Osinga, 2005, p. 1), a confidant of Boyd’s and at the time commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, summarized his influence on military strategy:

*The Iraqi army collapsed morally and intellectually under the onslaught of American and Coalition forces. John Boyd was an architect of that victory as surely as if he'd commanded a fighter wing or a maneuver division in the desert. His thinking, his theories, his larger than life influence were there with us in Desert Storm. He must have been proud of what his efforts wrought.*

Osinga (2005) noted that beyond the foundational outline of the maneuver warfare doctrine used by the Marine Corps in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, Boyd's influence reached deep into the theory of conflict. Such ideas as agility, shaping the mind of the enemy, harmony among all levels, and perhaps most important of all, promoting—not just exploiting or responding to—uncertainty and disorder, “were all either invented, re-discovered or inspired by Boyd.” (p. 4). Osinga concluded that

*Reading through Boyd's work nowadays one does not encounter novelty or experience difficulty following his arguments and accepting his ideas. His language and logic, his ideas, terms and concepts are part and parcel now of the military conceptual frame of reference. Western military organizations have to a large extent internalized Boyd's concepts, and perhaps even learned Boyd's way of thinking. (p. 316)*

Nissestad (2007) summarized Boyd's contributions to modern strategy, and particularly to its leadership component, as:

*Boyd was the first in the modern era to propose a comprehensive theory of strategy that is independent of size or technology and to identify an organizational climate for achieving it. (p. 11)*

*(Boyd) was the first to observe that the common underlying mechanism involved tactics that distort the enemy's perception of time. He*

*identified a general category of activities to achieve this distortion, the ability to change the situation faster than the opponent could comprehend, which he called “operating inside the Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop.” (pp. 11-12)*

*Boyd was not the first to appreciate initiative, even by privates and sailors, but he was the first to tie a specific climate based on initiative to the ability to generate rapid transients in combat and other conflicts. (p. 12)*

Prior to his career as a strategist, Boyd exercised a profound influence on the design of air-to-air fighter aircraft and the tactics used to employ them. He was the first to quantify the relative merits of two such aircraft across their entire flight envelopes, a method, “energy-maneuverability,” that is taught to fighter pilots to this day. Perhaps the best known aircraft designed “according to Boyd” is the F-16, which Boyd helped select as the winner of a competition in 1975 and is still in production (Coram, 2002; Hammond, 2001; Osinga, 2005).

Finally, at the end of his life, after the fall of the Soviet Union, he turned his attention away from war towards other forms of conflict, particularly business. Tom Peters referred to Boyd twice in his last major work, *Re-imagine!* (2003) and Boyd was an inspiration for Peters’ breakaway strategy book, *Thriving on Chaos* (Osinga, 2005; Richards 2004). Although Boyd did not write on business, per se, he did collaborate on my book, *Certain to Win* (Coram, 2002; Richards, 2004), which drew upon the common principles that underlie both Boyd’s concepts of moral and maneuver conflict and today’s lean philosophies in manufacturing and product development.

Boyd himself might once have lost interest in armed conflict, but his influence on our national defense debate lives on. The American Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates (2010), summarized Boyd's contributions in an address to cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs in April, 2010:

*As a 30-year-old captain, he rewrote the manual for air-to-air combat and earned the nickname "40-second" Boyd for the time it took him to win a dogfight. Boyd and the reformers he inspired would later go on to design and advocate for the F-16 and the A-10. After retiring, he developed the principles of maneuver warfare that were credited by a former Marine Corps commandant and a secretary of defense for the lightning victory of the first Gulf War.*

### **The OODA "Loop"**

If people know anything about Boyd, it generally has something to do with the OODA loop (Osinga 2005). The acronym "OODA" stands for "observe, orient, decide, act," and it is often depicted with the four elements arranged in a simple sequence, as if the acronym stood for "observe, then orient, then decide, then act," as shown in Figure 1 (Osinga 2005; Richards, 2004).




Figure 1. The OODA loop is often depicted as a simple sequential process.

Osinga (2005) described the usual interpretation of the OODA loop as a tool for strategy:

*In the popularized interpretation, the OODA loop suggests that success in war depends on the ability to out-pace and out-think the opponent, or put differently, on the ability to go through the OODA cycle more rapidly than the opponent. Boyd's name will probably always remain associated with the OODA loop and this popular interpretation. (p. 6)*

Thus the study of conflict is reduced to dueling OODA loops, with the side that can go through its loop the more quickly building an insurmountable competitive advantage. A corollary to this approach is that the side that can make the quickest decisions is most likely to win (Osinga, 2005).

As beguiling as this simple concept might be, it is not a powerful weapon of strategy, either in war or for business. There are several reasons for this possibly counterintuitive result:

- The most important is that a simple, sequential loop does not well model how organizations act in a conflict. A British officer, Jim Storr (as cited in Osinga, 2005, p. 8), summarized this situation:

*The OODA process is not circular. It apparently takes 24 hours to execute a divisional operation. Planning takes a minimum of 12 hours. Thus a divisional OODA loop would have to be at least 36 hours long. Yet the Gulf War and other recent operations show divisions reacting far faster. **Military forces do not in practice wait to observe until they have acted.** Observation, orientation and action are continuous processes, and decisions are made occasionally in consequences of them. There is no OODA loop. The idea of getting inside the enemy decision cycle is deeply flawed.* (emphasis added)

- It has sometimes proven advantageous to take extra time selecting a course of action—that is, reaching a decision to act—in order to create a more favorable environment for actions in the future.\* Such a slowing down in the tempo of operations is a common tactic by participants in the unconventional wars that

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\* “Taking extra time” does not mean that we become passive or give up the initiative. Commanders will, for example, continue to probe and test the adversary “to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions” (Boyd, 1996, p. 132; Sun Tzu, 1988).

developed countries are confronting today and which go under the names like “fourth generation warfare,” “insurgency,” and “protracted war” (Hammes, 2004).

- Similarly in business: One of the earliest papers on the Toyota Development System carried the subtitle, “How delaying decisions can make better cars faster” (Ward, Liker, Cristiano, & Sobeck, 1995). The authors of that paper noted that a company can minimize the total design time of a car not by making decisions more quickly than its competitors but by ensuring that decisions once made never need to be revisited.

With objections as serious as these, it is well that Boyd never drew the OODA “loop” as described by Storr and depicted in Figure 1, nor did he ever describe it as a sequential process in any of his works on competitive strategy.

### **The Real OODA “Loop”**

For his Ph.D. dissertation on Boyd, Dutch fighter Pilot Colonel Frans Osinga (2005) took the concept of rapid OODA looping head on. His thesis was, “Boyd’s OODA loop concept as well as his entire work are more comprehensive, deeper and richer than the popular notion of ‘rapid OODA looping’ his work is generally equated with” (p. 10). Far from discrediting the OODA loop, Osinga made the case that the power of Boyd’s ideas comes from using the right one, the “loop” that Boyd drew.



## Why an OODA Loop?

In his presentations on armed conflict—war—Boyd never wrote the term “OODA loop” alone but used the phrase “operating inside opponents’ OODA loops,” which he seemed careful never to define. The closest he came was 132 charts into his major briefing on war, *Patterns of Conflict* (Boyd, 1986), where he stated that to operate inside an adversary’s OODA loop could be “put another way” as “Observe, orient, decide and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity ...” Another way to think about operating inside the OODA loop is that we change the situation more rapidly than the opponent can comprehend (Boyd, 1986, p. 5). And keep doing it. These concepts go considerably deeper than cycling through “observe, then orient, then decide, then act” more rapidly than an opponent. He made the claim that the ability to perform the more sophisticated version enabled one to execute an agenda of heinous acts upon one’s adversary, ending with “Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos ... to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse” (Boyd, 1986, p. 132).

But what about the OODA loop itself, as contrasted with “operating inside the OODA loop”? Boyd (1996) made even more expansive claims for it:

*Without OODA loops, we can neither sense, hence observe, thereby collect a variety of information for the above processes, nor decide as well as implement actions in accord with these processes. (p. 1)*

When combined with the idea of operating inside an adversary’s OODA loops, the OODA loop provided the key to success not just in war but in life:

*Without OODA loops embracing all of the above and without the ability to get inside other OODA loops (or other environments), we will find it impossible to comprehend, shape, adapt to and in turn be shaped by an unfolding evolving reality that is uncertain, everchanging, and unpredictable. (Boyd, 1996, p. 2)*

In contrast to the concept of “operating inside the OODA loop,” however, Boyd not only defined the OODA loop, but drew a picture, Figure 2 (1996, p. 3), and it is safe to say it was not what most people expected.




Figure 2. The only OODA “loop” that Boyd actually drew.

### Interpreting the OODA “Loop” Sketch

The “loop” depicted in Figure 2 is a wonderful framework for strategy, but it can appear daunting at first. To get a handle on it, begin with the centrality of orientation and imagine that when we are engaged with opponents—or in the case of business, with competitors and customers—our actions will flow from it implicitly, that

is, without explicit (e.g., written or detailed verbal) commands or instructions, most of the time. Orientation is an ancient idea, embodied in the concept of mindfulness, but it is as modern as fighter pilots, who talk about maintaining “situation awareness.”

What this emphasis on orientation does is make conflict into a learning contest to better maintain awareness of the world, of, as Collins (2001) called it, the “brutal facts.” But success under this model is not a simple, accumulative process, where one gradually adds to one’s net competitive advantage account and the side with the higher balance wins. Instead, by maintaining better awareness, one can create opportunities to act in ways that opponents will see as highly irregular and disorienting. Boyd based much of his strategy on one of these, Sun Tzu’s “*cheng/ch’i*” (Boyd, 1987; Gimian & Boyce, 2008)\*.

### How to Become Certain to Win

The basic pattern is simple: An organization uses its better understanding of—clearer awareness of—the unfolding situation to set up its opponent by employing actions that fit with the opponent’s expectations, which Boyd, following Sun Tzu (trans. 1988), called the *cheng*. When the organization senses (viz. from its previous experiences, including training) that the time is ripe, it springs the *ch’i*, the unexpected, extremely rapidly (Gimian & Boyce, 2008).

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\* The official system, pinyin, for transliterating Chinese would write this as *zheng / qi*, which you are starting to see more often in books about oriental strategy.

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The primary reason for implicit guidance when engaged with opponents is that explicit instructions—written orders, for example—would take too much time. As Boyd (1987a) put it, “The key idea is to emphasize implicit over explicit in order to gain a favorable mismatch in friction and time (i.e, ours lower than any adversary’s) for superiority in shaping and adapting to circumstances” (p. 22).

For the same reason, initiating actions via the circular OODA loop does not work well when one is engaged with an opponent. The need to go through stages before coming around to action is too slow, as Storr observed, and too easy to disrupt (Klein, 1999). If, on the other hand, action can flow rapidly from orientation directly via an implicit guidance and control (IG&C) link, then any pattern of actions becomes possible. In particular, abrupt shifts, which Boyd (1986) called “asymmetric fast transients,” from *cheng* to *ch’i* are straightforward. Just fire the *ch’i* when the time is right. The jarring transition jerks opponents off balance mentally (sometimes physically) and sets them up for the exploitation to follow.

It is not difficult to see that the rapid shift from the expected to the unexpected—unleashing the *ch’i*—will work much better if the instructions to do so are largely implicit, flowing quickly and smoothly from similar implicit orientations among the individual team members. It is difficult, in fact, to see it working at all through layers of bureaucracy, endless meetings, and coordination of detailed written instructions.

*Cheng/ch’i* maneuvers are difficult to pull off against an opponent well versed in strategy. But when they succeed, the results are worth the effort. One of Boyd’s

favorite strategists, the 17<sup>th</sup> century samurai Miyamoto Musashi (trans. 1982), whose *Book of Five Rings* is still studied in both military and business schools, observed that such transients will produce a period, though perhaps only a moment, of confusion, hesitation, surprise, even debilitating shock and disorientation. During that period, when the opponent does not have an accurate understanding of the situation or the ability to formulate a coherent concept for dealing with it, we can act with little fear of effective counter-action. For this reason, some strategists including the commentators on Sun Tzu, the Japanese of the samurai period, and Boyd in our day have raised the study of *cheng/ch'i* to the level of art.

### **Exploiting the Unexpected in Business**

This is fine for war and other forms of our-side-vs-their-side conflict, where the effect on the other side is what counts. But when customers become involved, their reactions—what they buy and at what price—trump everything else. If the *cheng/ch'i* concept is to be useful in business, it must influence the customer. To see how this can happen, consider how one effect of *ch'i*, surprise, works on customers. If you make an analogy with war, you can try to shock them—the effect extreme surprise produces in war—but that may not entice them to buy more from us or to buy anything at all from us ever again.

But if we work it cleverly via a deep understanding of our customers, we might delight them. Instead of surprise → shock → exploitation, as in war and the martial arts, *cheng/ch'i* could operate as something more like surprise → delight &

fascination → become more committed customers. Apple plays this game, the “pursuit of wow!” as Tom Peters (1995) once described it, very well. I discuss *cheng / ch’i* for business in Chapter 6 of *Certain to Win*.

It is important to realize that we are not talking in terms of analogies and metaphors. *Cheng/ch’i* in business is not “like” the concept in war (that would probably give you something like “shock the competitors”), it is exactly the same concept, but it manifests itself differently in the different arenas, war and business.

### Time for Action

*The movements of a master of a path do not appear to be unduly fast.*  
(Musashi, 1982, p. 94)

Boyd (1987b) concluded that at times, such as exploiting a breakthrough, we should generate actions at a very rapid tempo—*cheng/ch’i* after *cheng/ch’i* after *cheng/ch’i*—before the opponent can understand what is happening. Sounds powerful, and it might lead you to think that we should always act at a faster tempo or rhythm than our competitors, perhaps even that faster tempo is synonymous with operating inside the OODA loop.\* There may be other situations, however, such as designing a car using the Toyota Development System, when an organization’s tempo appears slow, but the end result—as we have seen—is that it achieves its objectives more

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\* If the circular OODA loop is your only model, then “tempo” and “speed through the loop” are synonymous, and the only way to “operate inside an opponent’s OODA loop” would be to go through the (circular) OODA loop more quickly.

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rapidly than its competition. Such a result is entirely consistent with the concept of keeping our orientation better matched to reality than our opponents', or our competitors' and customers', and, when we sense the time is right, firing actions from orientation using an IG&C link. That is, with the OODA "loop" depicted in Figure 2.

### **Using the OODA "Loop"**

As noted in the previous section, Boyd intended the OODA "loop" to be a guide for action. Here are some ideas for employing the "loop" to improve an organization's ability to act.

#### **Singing From the Same Sheet**

The first, following the ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu (trans. 1988), is to ensure that everyone on the team shares a similar view of the world. Successful organizations exploit the variety of experiences and perspectives found within their members, but they also harmonize them to accomplish common objectives. This is not as easy as it seems. Rigidly enforced organizational dogma, for example, can produce a type of harmony, but it rarely encourages initiative. There is a way, however, to achieve both harmony and initiative. Boyd (1986) asserted that "Without a common outlook superiors cannot give subordinates freedom-of-action and maintain coherency of ongoing action." Therefore, "A common outlook ... represents a unifying theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative yet realize

superior intent” (p. 74). Research is confirming this: Espevik, Johnson, Eid, and Thayer (2006), for example, found that when members of a group share mental models of the situation, typically by keeping the group intact during training and operations, their performance can be sustained even under conditions of stress.

Boyd (1987a) suggested a similar conclusion in terms of shared orientations:

*Arrange the setting and circumstances so that leaders and subordinates alike are given the opportunity to continuously interact with the external world, and with each other, in order to more quickly make many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections as well as create the similar images or impressions, hence a similar implicit orientation, needed to form an organic whole. (p. 18)*

It is hard to overstate the impact of shared orientation. One company that I’ve worked with, for example, has found that by concentrating on maintaining an accurate common implicit orientation, actions that routinely took weeks to select can now be initiated in minutes (T. Barnhart, Pfizer, personal communication, August 2010).

Before leaving the subject of common implicit orientation and the implicit guidance and control that it enables, we need to admit that there are times when you cannot use the IG&C link. One of these is when nuclear weapons are involved. Another is when dealing with money, as anyone who has ever filed an expense report knows. In addition to money, there are now a whole host of “compliance” requirements where explicit documentation is required. These nuclear and legal considerations aside,



there is another circumstance where you can't use implicit guidance and control, and that's when you don't have the common implicit orientation needed for it. At the start of an operation, for example, you will need to assign specific missions or lay down time, financial, or other guidelines. Do this sparingly, with a light touch, and as orally as possible. Think of it as a test of your skill as a leader.

Once things are underway, you would like to shift to implicit guidance and control to reduce friction and gain time advantages. But let's be brutally frank: Although implicit guidance and control is the ideal, in the real world, sometimes it just doesn't work. This can happen when certain subordinates don't have the individual or group (common) experience or the personalities that would let you lead them implicitly so you are reduced to managing them explicitly. In other words, with some people you are willing to give up the benefits of initiative because you're tired of herding cats.

As Musashi (1982, p. 14) put it in his carpenter analogy:

*To accomplish a task quickly and to perform it well is not to be haphazard about anything; to know where and when to use who and what; to know whether or not there is incentive; to give encouragement and to know limitations; these are what a master carpenter keeps in mind. The principles of strategy are the same.*

To use the magic of IG&C, you have to know the people on your team as individuals. It will work with some of them, but if you get too implicit too soon, before someone is ready for it, the results will be comical at best.

## Brutal Reality

The purpose of continuously interacting with the external world is to ensure that an organization's (similar implicit) orientation is at all times more accurate than any competitor's. Then, by interacting with each other, members naturally keep their orientations aligned. The result is, in Boyd's words, an organic system for command and control. Even so, human factors such as misunderstandings, jealousy, peer pressures, and deference to rank can corrupt the process.

In fact, the situation is much, much worse. We've been discussing the IG&C link from orientation to action, but there's another one, from orientation to observation. Orientation, whether we want it to or not, exerts a strong control over what we observe. To a great extent, a person hears, as Paul Simon wrote in "The Boxer," what he wants to hear and disregards the rest. This tendency to confirm what we already believe is not just sloppy thinking but is built into our brains (Molenberghs, Halász, Mattingley, Vanman. and Cunnington, 2012). If you search the Internet for "confirmation bias" and "change blindness," you will find many examples including the famous video of a person in a gorilla suit strolling around in the middle of a group tossing a ball back and forth. About 50% of people who watch this video fail to notice the gorilla (Simons and Chabris, 2010) .

Strategists call the tendency to observe data that confirm our current orientations "incestuous amplification": Orientation influences observation via that other IG&C link to find data that confirm our orientation. So confirmed, orientation now even more strongly influences observation to find ... (Gimian & Boyce, 2008;

Spinney, 2008). It is difficult to detect and for all practical purposes impossible to overcome only from within the organization because, well, all the data confirm the accepted view of the world. People who take opposing views are marginalized.\*

In threatening situations like military actions or natural emergencies, these effects are often fatal, and clever strategists can use them against their opponents, as when Sun Tzu (1988, p. 161) advised his followers to “accord deceptively with the intentions of the enemy.” Play mind games with the opponent, locking in the *cheng* and making the *ch’i*, when it is sprung, that much more shattering and disruptive. For all of these reasons, Boyd considered the requirement to assess (he used the term “appreciate”) the accuracy and depth of common understanding in an organization to be one of the primary functions of leadership (1987a).

### **Just When They Thought They Had You Figured Out**

*Theory must have the discipline of experiment if it is to remain focused on the things that really matter, the things that manifestly happen in the real world. (Baggott, 2011, p. 408)*

Boyd (1996) defined “repertoire” as those actions that an organization knows so well that it can initiate them via an IG&C link directly from its (shared implicit)

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\* Even attempting to assess the status of the organization only from inside the organization will increase the confusion and disorder within it. This was Boyd’s first major conclusion on strategy, from his 1976 paper, “Destruction and Creation” (Spinney, 1998).

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orientation. This is typically how we act when engaged with a fast thinking and acting opponent.

We must achieve excellence in our repertoire: Our actions must accomplish what we intend them to accomplish. It is not enough, though, to be able to perform the same set of tasks more quickly and more smoothly day after day. Organizations that take only this approach make themselves vulnerable to competitors who observe them carefully, become able to predict these actions, and create new ways to counter and exploit them.

So the question naturally arises of where our repertoire comes from and how we add to it. Oddly, given the emphasis so far on the IG&C link, the process for generating new actions is reminiscent of Figure 1, involving a classic loop of observation, analyses & synthesis, hypothesis, and test. Although the circular OODA loop in Figure 1 is such a process, there are many others, including the Deming's Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle, Toyota's various scientific thinking processes (Shingo, 2006), and the "logical thinking process" used by practitioners of Goldratt's theory of constraints (Dettmer, 2007).

These circular processes generate novelty, and the process of using them is what we call science and engineering. In a broader sense, they apply to the arena of competition by creating the tools that strategy and tactics employ. The idea is that through repeated looping (observation, analyses & synthesis, hypothesis, and test) as individuals and as organizations, we engineer new options into our repertoire that we can use via an IG&C link and so realize the full power of Figure 2 (Boyd, 1996).

While it is true that most of the items in our repertoire are created (“invented”) during training sessions, this is not enough. We don’t know how well our new actions will work against a particular opponent until we try them. And if they don’t work quite as planned, then what? Success against thinking adversaries or competitors, and *with* customers, requires not only using our current repertoire largely via an IG&C link but also and at the same time keeping our grey matter engaged to think up and try new actions on the fly and find new ways to employ our existing set of actions, as illustrated in Figure 3 (Boyd, 1992).




Figure 3. Keep your brain engaged, always.

Although this may sound like an impossible task, the need to think on one's feet is well known to the military, who call it by such terms as "agility" and "adaptive leadership" (Albrecht, 2010). Vandergriff (2006) has developed methods for building this ability in junior officers, and leaders in other fields may find his methods applicable to their organizations.

To "think on one's feet" at the organizational level requires a high degree of trust. Consider a situation where the group faces imminent destruction from an enemy attack or even from drowning or starvation, and suppose also that the members of the group do not agree on the seriousness of the threat or how to deal with it. To make things more interesting, throw in normal human emotions like jealousy, suspicion, and resentment. In OODA loop terms, this means that action cannot flow smoothly and quickly from a similar implicit orientation among group members because there is no such orientation. It also means that the group cannot invent and implement a new action on the fly because it cannot agree on which action to take. In extreme cases, such as an enemy operating inside its OODA loops—or nature acting as if it were—the group shatters into bickering sub-groups, takes no effective action, and perishes (T. Krabberød, personal communication, March 5, 2012, citing Weick, 1993).

Because both of these functions—employing our current repertoire and creating new actions and tactics—must operate at the same time, the OODA "loop" sketch in Figure 2 is about as simple as it can be. It's worth pointing out that the process of

observation, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis and test that creates novelty for strategy to employ also updates our orientations, including our concepts for employing that novelty (Boyd, 1992; Wass de Czege, 2011). The circular process, therefore, not only performs the function of engineering for a participant in a conflict but fulfills the purpose of science as well.

Astute readers may have noticed one other use for the embedded Figure 1 OODA loop, and that is, as noted above, when you cannot use the IG&C link and so must include explicit directives and communications. You will give up the advantages of initiative and will slow things down to boot, but sometimes it is the best you can do. Outside of the nuclear and legal reasons for using the Figure 1 loop, though, I would regard controlling actions with explicit guidance as an experiment because you never know what is going to happen.

Here's an important caution: The loop of Figure 1 should not be regarded as a simplification or introductory version of the real "loop" in Figure 2 because that will lead you into the problem identified by Storr: *Military forces do not in practice wait to observe until they have acted*. Better to start off on the right foot by regarding the OODA of Figure 1 as a subset embedded in Figure 2 that describes Boyd's concept for generating useful novelty and updating orientation (Spinney, 1998). No organization is going to be successful unless it can do all three:

**Using (primarily) the IG&C link:**

1. Employ the existing repertoire;

**Using the circular (Figure 1) OODA process:**

2. Create and test new actions (both while in training and on the fly), and
3. Update orientations

simultaneously and harmoniously, with each function reinforcing the others. The OODA “loop” in Figure 2 captures all of this.

### Creating Repertoire

*There are normally two reactions to what I have set forth in this article. One is, “We think this way already, but our thought processes are quicker, simpler and more natural.” To this I say, “Really? Show me.” (Wass de Czege, 2011, p. 56)*

To create a repertoire, a set of actions that we can apply intuitively, we need an organizational climate that encourages what we might call “OODA loop thinking.” Like so much in Boyd’s scheme, this doesn’t happen by accident, and you won’t have much success by ordering it into existence. What you can do is make changes to your organizational system and guide, primarily through the analytical/synthetic process, the evolution of new practices.

Here are a few suggestions to help you get started:

- Establish a school. The military have any number of educational institutions, from the German *Kriegsakademie* of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries to the



various staff and war colleges of the U.S. and other militaries today. These serve to provide a common foundation (which the military calls “doctrine”) on which to build the similar implicit orientation required by the OODA loop.

- Give your human resources department a mission other than pushing papers and acting as bureaucratic police. The best mission might be as keeper of the culture, but without a day-to-day line management role (Boyd, 1987a; Welch J. & Welch S., 2005). Consider recruiting from line management as a special tour of duty for high potentials: They operate in the culture, then they get to step back and think about the culture. There are other possibilities. Family-controlled businesses, for example, have the unique advantage of being able to use non-employee family members as keepers of the culture, sort of an inside/outside play (Astrachan, Richards, Marchisio & Manners, 2010).

For the specifics of a competitive culture, Boyd (1986) suggested an “organizational climate”—the four German words described in *Certain to Win* (Richards, 2004)—whose most important attribute is that it fosters creativity and initiative throughout the organization (Nissestad, 2007). Your team should investigate, make your own decisions, and document them in an organizational doctrine.

- Write and nurture a living doctrine manual as the explicit component of an organization’s culture, of its common orientation. Boyd, incidentally, would not agree: “Doctrine on day one, dogma on day two” was how he put it. This is a risk. On the other hand, if, as part of your common orientation, you

recognize the risk, and if the keepers of the culture are doing their jobs (and if not, you're doomed anyway), you can have the advantages that doctrine provides while avoiding the dogma tar pit. Here's a suggestion: Make "doctrine on day one, dogma on day two" the first element of your manual.

Think of doctrine not as a checklist or menu that must be followed (or else!) but as *standardized work*, in the language of the Toyota Way (Liker, 2004; Ohno, 1988). Toyota (1992) considers standardized work to be a critical part of their system:

*Standardized work and kaizen are two sides of the same coin. ... Standardized work provides a consistent basis for maintaining productivity, quality, and safety at high levels. Kaizen furnishes the dynamism of continuing improvement and the very human motivation of encouraging individuals to take part in designing and managing their own jobs. (p. 38)*

In other words, rather than enforcing conformity and the status quo, standardized work encourages initiative and creativity within the framework of the Toyota Production System. In particular, if a team member has an idea for improvement, it provides an explicit, data-derived standard to test it against. Toyota, in fact, requires a formal process of observation, analysis and synthesis, hypothesis and test that would make any scientist proud, even for minor changes (*kaizen*) to standardized work (Spear & Bowen, 1999; Shingo, 2006).

Your doctrine manual is one device for retaining what you've learned through your analytical/synthetic processes and for spreading this knowledge throughout the organization. Given its importance to the organization, you might consider a contribution to the manual to be a prerequisite for promotion to senior levels.

- All of the above is interesting but falls into the category of navel gazing unless it results in effective actions. In business, for example, “effective” has something to do with customers buying whatever we’re selling. So we can apply a simple test, first suggested to me by one of my colleagues at Kennesaw State University: “Can you *demonstrate* that you understand what your customers want?” (G. E. Manners, personal communication, January 15, 2009). Your understanding of what your customers want—what they will spend money on—is part of your orientation, of course, which means that we can generalize this challenge to: Can we demonstrate that our orientation is more accurate and more deeply shared than any of our competitors’? Are we, for example, any better at recognizing mismatches than they are? Oh, really? Show me. You can apply this simple test to practically all of the recommendations that Boyd made, and senior management must create an environment where people enjoy and take pride in doing so.

## Conclusion

Boyd's OODA "loop" provides an effective framework for igniting creativity and initiative throughout an organization and harmonizing them to achieve the organization's goals. For the "loop" to work, however, organizations must use the one Boyd actually drew and evolve their own practices suitable for their people and their competitive environments.

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